Abstract-With the advent of Chip Multiprocessors (CMPs), improving performance relies on the programmers/compilers to expose thread level parallelism to the underlying hardware. However, this is a difficult and error-prone process for the programmers, while state of the art compiler techniques are unable to provide significant benefits for many classes of applications. An alternative is offered by systems that support Thread Level Speculation (TLS), which relieve the programmer and compiler from checking for thread dependences and instead use the hardware to enforce them.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the absence of coarse grained parallelism, the performance potential of Chip Multiprocessors (CMPs) remains unfulfilled. To improve performance of sequential programs on CMPs, attempts are made to extract thread level parallelism from the sequential program flow. This may be done manually by the programmer or through various compiler techniques. When a sequential program is parallelized conventionally, the programmer or compiler needs to ensure that threads are free of data dependences. If data dependences do exist, threads must be carefully synchronized to ensure that no violations occur. Specially for languages that support pointers, compile time disambiguation is often impossible. This means that compilers are often unable to extract much parallelism from sequential code. In the absence of speculation, inter-thread dependences constrain performance and automated thread partitioning seldom results in high performance [6] .
With Thread Level Speculation (TLS), the compiler only needs to divide the code into threads. It does not need to guarantee that the multithreaded code is free of data dependences. If a dependence violation occurs at run-time, the speculation hardware detects the violation and rolls back the violating thread to a safe state. This mechanism allows the compiler to parallelize very aggressively and extract parallel threads from code that would otherwise not be parallelizable.
Unfortunately, dependence violations come at a significant cost since intermediate results have to be discarded and the thread performing the offending load has to roll back to its start. These roll backs are a major source of energy inefficiency in TLS systems, since when they happen the same instructions are executed multiple times. For this reason checkpointing schemes have been proposed [3] , [21] . When a task is checkpointed, a dependence violation only requires a roll back to a checkpoint preceding the violating load, rather than to the start of the task. This leads to a reduction in wasted energy while maintaining performance.
In this paper we argue that previous work in the area of checkpointing speculative tasks has left many open questions. We provide a detailed study of the mechanisms involved in checkpointing and the policy issues that it exposes. Specifically, we apply checkpointing to a state-of-the-art TLS system that supports out of order spawning of speculative tasks [13] . We observe task behavior and conclude that the base protocol is not well suited to checkpointed execution. This leads to extensions in the protocol to allow effective checkpointing. We modify the TLS restart mechanism to increase overlap and the memory system to reduce pressure on the speculative buffer. Further, we study the problem of where to place checkpoints. We show that program counter and hybrid predictors perform significantly better than previously proposed address based predictors.
This paper shows that with the architectural extensions we provide and carefully chosen insertion policy, checkpointing can help address the energy cost of TLS. It does so by maintaining the performance advantage of TLS over sequential execution, but at the same time reducing the power consumed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of the TLS and existing checkpoint schemes. Section III presents our efficient checkpointing schemes, which remove many of the unnecessary roll-backs due to memory violations. Section IV describes the experimental methodology and Section V presents results. Finally, Section VI discusses related work and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Background on TLS
Under the TLS execution model, a sequential application is split into threads which are then speculatively executed in parallel with the hope that their concurrent execution will not violate sequential semantics [4] , [5] , [8] , [16] , [17] . The control flow of the sequential code imposes a total order on the threads. A thread is said to be speculative if it is executing such that it is overlapped with a part of the program that is earlier in sequential order. Threads earlier in the sequential flow are termed less speculative than later threads. During speculative execution of threads, reads are monitored to detect dependence violations. Writes may be forwarded from less speculative threads to more speculative ones in order to minimize violations. If a dependence violation is found, the offending thread must be squashed, along with its successors, thus reverting the state back to a safe position from which threads can be re-executed. In most schemes a squash rolls the execution back to the start of the thread, but some proposals in the literature use periodic checkpointing of threads [3] such that upon a squash it is only necessary to roll the execution back to the closest safe checkpointed state. When the execution of a non-speculative thread completes it commits and the values it generated can be moved to safe storage. At this point its immediate successor acquires non-speculative status and is allowed to commit. When a speculative thread completes it must wait for all predecessors to commit before it can commit.
Speculative threads are usually extracted from either loop iterations or function continuations. The compiler marks these structures with a fork-like spawn instruction, so that the execution of such an instruction leads to a new speculative thread. In order to extract more parallelism, it is also possible to create speculative threads from nested subroutines and loop iterations. Such schemes are said to have out-of-order spawn and have been shown to provide significant performance benefits [13] .
B. Background on Intermediate Checkpointing
Intermediate Checkpointing (IC) schemes aim to reduce the misspeculation penalty by allowing partial rollback. This is done by checkpointing the processor at some point or points during the execution of a task, and upon detecting a violation, only rolling back to the latest checkpoint which allows correct re-execution. These schemes are guided by a dependence predictor [21] , or some other heuristic (e.g., whether the number of instructions since the last checkpoint exceeds a certain value [3] ). Once a positive prediction is obtained, the processor state is checkpointed and a subthread is created which has as its first instruction the predicted load. As with any other threads, the subthreads can be checkpointed as well if they encounter a load that is predicted to cause a violation.
III. EFFICIENT CHECKPOINTING
A. Understanding Intermediate Checkpointing
In this section we try to shed some light on the subtleties that arise when Intermediate Checkpointing (IC) is applied to a state-of-the-art TLS system. We discuss the different design options and describe the architectural extensions required, so as to make IC both practical and efficient.
1) Base Checkpointing Model:
To explain the base checkpointing model we start with a code snippet example in Figure 1a . We see a load through p on line 3 and a store through p on line 6, hence there is a loop carried data dependence which may cause the speculative task to restart. In Figure 1b , we see what happens if we try to speculatively execute one iteration of the loop without checkpoints: the store in the safe thread causes the speculative thread to squash and re-execute. However, if we checkpoint just before the load on line 3, we only need to rewind partially, saving wasteful execution. This case is shown in Figure 1c .
2) Checkpointing Mechanism:
The insertion of checkpoints in our scheme is quite straightforward. When a task is to be checkpointed, we simply spawn a new task which is an immediate successor to it. We shall refer to this new task as the checkpoint. Further, we take a snapshot of the register file in case the checkpoint task needs to be restarted 1 . We constrain the newly created checkpoint task to remain on the same core as the checkpointed task. This simplifies the protocol and keeps overheads low because live registers do not need to be communicated across cores. Apart from this, the checkpoint is treated as any other speculative task. Any violations affecting the checkpoint only cause a restart to the checkpoint, and violations affecting the checkpointed task cause the checkpointed task to restart and, since the checkpoint is a successor task, the checkpoint is killed. The versioned memory mechanism ensures that tasks have the correct state just as with normal tasks. It is worth observing that if the TLS protocol only allows in-order tasks, only the most speculative task can be checkpointed in this way. Since we use a base protocol that allows out-of-order spawn, we can checkpoint any task, whether it is the most speculative or not. However, as we demonstrate below through examples, there are some extensions required to the TLS protocol to allow checkpointing to be effective in improving performance and reducing the energy consumed.
3) Hardware Requirements: The hardware changes required to allow checkpointing speculative tasks are minimal. The only difference between a normal spawn and a checkpoint is that a checkpoint requires a snapshot of register state. This can be done either by sets of registers in the processor, or by storing these snapshots in memory. If the former route is chosen, snapshots can be taken very quickly, perhaps with no time penalty at all, but the number of checkpoints is limited. Such register copies are already supported in processors to allow recovery from branch mispredictions. If, on the other hand, registers need to be transferred to memory for each checkpoint, there is an associated latency. Storing the snapshot in memory need not cause a delay, since this process is not on the critical path and can be buffered and performed lazily. However, rewinding to a checkpoint would incur memory access latency in this case. It is also possible to envision a hybrid process, which would keep register state for some checkpoints on the processor but allow older checkpoints or those less likely to be used to be moved to memory. If those checkpoints that are more likely to be needed can by successfully identified, this approach could give the best of both worlds. For the rest of this paper, checkpointing through extra register files in the processor is modeled.
B. Proposed Architectural Support for Efficient Checkpoints 1) Improved Restart Mechanism:
We again refer to the example in order to explain the restart mechanism. If we examine Figure 1b where the base TLS execution is shown, we can see that a violating store to p in the safe task 1 causes task 2 to be restarted and tasks 3 and 4 to be killed. However, the restarted task 2 quickly causes new tasks to be spawned. Now, looking at the case in Figure 1c , we see that we save re-execution by only rewinding to the checkpoint before the offending load in task 2. In this case, the cores that are left idle because tasks 3 and 4 are killed remain idle until task 2 finishes executing. Checkpointing causes this behavior often since when tasks are not rolled back completely, they do not necessarily re-spawn child tasks that have been killed. This is specially true of loop speculation where spawns are often at the very start of tasks. This issue can be rectified with some changes to the TLS protocol, which we propose below.
When a task is restarted, we have to be careful to maintain correctness in more speculative tasks. In the base protocol, this is achieved by simply killing all tasks more speculative than a task that is restarted, Figure 2a . We observe that this is excessively conservative. The only tasks that have to be killed are those that were spawned incorrectly. That is, those tasks that were spawned by execution that turned out to have misspeculated. So we kill each task whose parent (spawning) task has been restarted or killed. For other tasks, even though they were spawned correctly, it is still possible that they have consumed invalid values forwarded from less speculative tasks. Therefore we restart all other tasks that are more speculative than a killed or restarted task. This issue is specific to out-oforder spawn, since if spawns are only in-order, for any given task, all tasks that are more speculative have been spawned by it or its successor. Now, if the new restarting algorithm is used, we get the situation in Figure 1d . The checkpoint for task 2 gets restarted, but the checkpointed task does not receive a restart. This means that the task for iteration 3 now receives a restart instead of a kill since its parent is not in the restart/kill chain, and it immediately spawns off a new task 4. We see that checkpointing is no longer causing processors to remain idle.
Going further, not all more speculative tasks need to even be restarted. A given task requires a restart only if it has overlap with misspeculated execution 2 . This observation has previously been made by Colohan et al. [3] . In that work, timestamps are tracked to compare the start time of a task receiving a violation with the end time of more speculative tasks. If there is any overlap, the more speculative task is restarted, otherwise nothing needs to be done. To maintain correctness, we need to ensure that no invalid forwarded values can be kept. Since the correctness of forwarded values is not guaranteed until the source task of the value commits, all tasks that get killed or restarted must undergo a timestamp comparison with more speculative tasks, not just the task receiving a violation. the violation is not sufficient to guarantee correctness. The algorithm for selectively restarting tasks using timestamps is shown in Figure 2b . When the restart/kill signal is propagated, each task is checked against the earliest start time of any task that has been killed or restarted in the chain. If there is any overlap, that is, the end time of the task in question is later than the start time of any killed/restarted task, the more speculative task is restarted. Otherwise nothing needs to be done.
2) Reducing Pressure on Speculative Buffer: The advantage of treating checkpoints like any other speculative task is that the TLS protocol needs very little change to support checkpoints. The primary disadvantage appears in increased pressure on versioned memory. Each checkpoint has to maintain a version of any speculative data. In the base TLS protocol, this means allocating a speculative line for every block that has been read by the checkpoint. Our experiments show that this causes many restarts/kills because tasks run out of speculative state in the L1 cache. Data locality makes it likely that a checkpoint will read locations read by its parent. This results in duplicate versions of data.
To deal with this problem, we propose some changes to the memory protocol. These are based on a certain relationship between a checkpointed task and its checkpoint. Specifically, it is guaranteed that a checkpointed task will have no overlapped execution with its checkpoint, and that the checkpoint will be the immediately more speculative task. With these in mind, we can relax some of the constraints of the data versioning protocol. If the checkpoint accesses a location that is marked as an exposed read by its parent, it does not need to allocate a line. This is because if that read turns out to be a misspeculation, the parent will be restarted, killing the checkpoint 3 . Changing the protocol so that these unnecessary speculative lines are not allocated removes almost all the extra restarts caused by running out of versioned memory. Note that stores still need to be buffered separately for the checkpoint and its 2 Strictly speaking, a restart is only required if an incorrect value was forwarded from misspeculated execution. The scheme can be made more precise by tracking forwarded values but we avoid the complexity of that here. 3 Because there is no overlap between the checkpointed task and its checkpoint, any misspeculation will be because of store from a task less speculative than the checkpointed task. The checkpointed task cannot be a source of misspeculation in the checkpoint. parent in order to allow partial roll back, so checkpointing is not completely free of overhead in speculative state buffering.
C. Placing Checkpoints
The important policy question when checkpointing tasks is where to insert checkpoints. It is possible to place checkpoints explicitly based on static or profile based analysis. Existing work on static synchronization [22] can be leveraged for this purpose. However, this work focuses on dynamic hardware schemes and these are discussed below.
1) Fixed Instruction Strides:
This is the simplest of the checkpointing policies we evaluate. Stride checkpointing involves inserting a checkpoint every N instructions. This method has been proposed in [3] . The only additional hardware required for placing checkpoints by instruction stride is a counter to keep track of the number of instructions since the start of a task or the previous checkpoint.
2) Address Based Checkpointing: Waliullah and Stenstrom [21] proposed inserting checkpoints before loads from addresses that have been seen to violate previously. Every time a violation occurs, the target address of the violating store is added to a Critical Address Table. On every load, the buffer is checked to see if the load address is critical. If it is found in the table, it is potentially violating and a checkpoint can be inserted. There is a Critical Address Table placed per core. 3) Program Counter Based Checkpointing: Address based checkpointing works well in most cases, but there are some commonly seen patterns in integer programs where it fails to identify dependent loads. These include array operations and pointer chasing. Examples are shown in Figure 3 . In Figure 3a , there is a dependence through a member of a different object pointed to through p for each iteration. Figure 3b shows a loop carried dependence through a different element of array A[] for each iteration. Both of these constitute loop carried dependences that are not predictable by address. For cases such as this, we can predict using the violation history of instructions rather than memory addresses.
We use a table based mechanism for Program Counter based prediction, similar to that used for address based prediction. The only change is that when a violation occurs, the program counter of the instruction performing the exposed load that led to the violation is inserted into the Critical PC Table. For each load instruction, a prediction can be obtained for checking whether the program counter is contained in the Critical PC Table. If the PC is contained in this table, a dependence is predicted.
Predicting dependences through the Program Counter does present one complication. When a dependence violation occurs, the Program Counter of the violating load is not directly available. The address of the violating store (and hence the corresponding load) is known. This means that this scheme requires some way of associating the address of an exposed load with the Program Counter of the instruction performing it. This can be done through another 
4) Hybrid Prediction:
Any system that runs a variety of workloads will encounter dependences that are predictable by one type of predictor but not the other. In fact, the same program may show both kinds of behavior. The obvious solution is to use hybrid predictors, which employ both techniques.
The simplest way of achieving this is to have both address and Program Counter based predictors, in which case a positive prediction is returned if either predicts a dependence. That is, the outputs of the predictors are ORed. To build a less aggressive predictor, the outputs can be ANDed. A more sophisticated two-level predictor can also be constructed. The presence of some dependences can be identified better through load addresses, and for others by the Program Counter. This points to a construction where there is a Program Counter based meta-predictor which decides which predictor to use for a particular instruction. Such a predictor is shown in Figure 4 .
As with conventional hybrid branch predictors [9] , we update the meta predictor only when the predictors disagree, while the other components are always updated.
D. Checkpoint Insertion Policy
In a realistic checkpointing system, there will be some limit on the number of checkpoints it is possible to place per task. Further, there will be some overhead associated with placing checkpoints. This may be in latency or in additional speculative buffer state required, as discussed earlier in Section III-A3. In the presence of such limits and costs, it may not be profitable to place a checkpoint on every positive prediction. Hence, the insertion policy takes resource constraints into account.
In the simplest case, we insert a checkpoint on every predicted dependence. This can lead to very small tasks, and the number of checkpoints available is exhausted quickly. Further, even small overheads become significant if checkpoints are placed too often. We construct a hybrid heuristic which takes these issues into account and becomes more cautious about inserting a checkpoint as the number of checkpoints for a task increases. The policy chosen for checkpointing is the following:
Where CP max is the maximum number of checkpoints allowed, and CP is the number of checkpoints already placed. Size of Task is measured in the number of instructions from the start of the task, or the latest checkpoint if a checkpoint has already been placed. Here, the constant C is the threshold for task size when choosing to place the last available checkpoint ( when CP = CP max − 1). The effect of the heuristic is to have a low threshold for task size when a large number of checkpoints are available, and increase it to the maximum value C when there is only one more checkpoint available. The value for C is chosen experimentally to be 100.
E. Microarchitectural Interactions
Beyond the basic architectural support for checkpoints discussed in Section III-A2, checkpoint insertion schemes have their own interactions with the microarchitecture. Even though we treat checkpoints as speculative tasks, the existing task spawning mechanism may not be sufficient. When a checkpoint is inserted, it is important that loads and stores on either side of the checkpoint boundary are marked with the correct task ID in the versioned cache. Also, the register file must be checkpointed at the state after the last instruction of the checkpointed task in sequential execution. In a modern pipelined processor, this can be achieved by performing the checkpoint in two stages. In the first stage, once the instruction where the checkpoint is to be placed is identified, all memory operations after that in sequential order are marked with the child task ID. Second, when the earlier identified instruction is ready to commit, a snapshot of the register file is taken to associate with the checkpoint.
The stride case (Section III-C1) is simple. Since the decision to insert a checkpoint is based on instruction counts, the instruction to be checkpointed can be known even before it is decoded.
For PC based checkpoints (Section III-C3), this is straightforward as well. We can query the predictor when the instruction is fetched. If we assume a low latency prediction (reasonable based on the small violation table we use), we can have a prediction even before decode. Address based prediction (Section III-C2) is far more problematic. A prediction cannot be made until the load address is available. The address may be computed late in the pipeline, and out-of-order processors will already have reordered instructions. It is necessary for correctness that a load which is in the parent thread not be marked as being in the child thread 4 . If this does happen, it is possible that the checkpoint will receive a violation that should go to its parent, resulting in execution not being rewound as far as it should be and possible incorrect state.
This means that, for the sake of correctness, the system either has to ensure that the load in question does not get issued before any loads that it follows, or alternately has to correct IDs if this does occur.
We see that stride and PC based predictors are easier to implement, and that the PC based prediction can better deal with latency in obtaining predictions and hence will allow the use of larger tables or more complicated prediction techniques.
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY a) Simulation Environment:
We conduct our experiments using the SESC simulator [14] . SESC models a full out-oforder pipeline with branch prediction, caches, buses, and every other component of a modern processor necessary for accurate simulation. The simulator has been extended to include dependence prediction and checkpointing support.
The main microarchitectural features of the baseline system are listed in Table I . The system we simulate is a multicore with 4 processors, where each processor is 4-issue out-of-order superscalar. The access latencies and power consumption are obtained using CACTI [19] and wattch [1] .
To ensure that we start from an energy efficient baseline, our base TLS system includes previously proposed energy saving techniques [12] . For the TLS protocol we assume out-oforder spawning support [13] . The power modeling takes into account both the base TLS and the checkpointing mechanism. When evaluating checkpointing, the power model accounts for the checkpoint placement mechanism and accesses to the predictor tables. For power purposes, placing a checkpoint and recovering to a checkpoint are modeled as copying and reading all the architectural registers. Each speculative load adds an access to the dependence predictor.
b) Benchmarks: We use the integer programs from the SPEC CPU 2000 benchmark suite running the Reference data set. We use the entire suite except eon, gcc and perlbmk, which failed to compile in our infrastructure. The TLS binaries were obtained with the POSH infrastructure [7] . We are also using astar, bzip2, mcf and sphinx3 from the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite running the Training data set. This subset of SPEC 2006 was chosen because it shows good TLS potential and is not trivial to parallelize [11] . For these benchmarks, high coverage loops have been selected for speculation. bzip2 and mcf show behavior similar to their SPEC2000 counterparts, hence they are not discussed in the results section.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Evaluating Dependence Predictors
For the evaluation of the predictors, no checkpointing is performed. This allows easier comparison of predictors, since predictions do not modify execution and no secondary effects are introduced, hence each predictor sees exactly the same memory accesses and dependences. Figure 5 shows the performance of address based, Program Counter based and hybrid dependence predictors. For all tables, a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) replacement policy is used, and Critical Address and Critical PC Table sizes are varied from 1 to 32. For the hybrid bimodal predictor, a 128 entry, 5 bit metatable is employed. This predictor is shown as Hybridbi-128-5bit in the figure. To keep latency low, we model a predictor per processor rather than a global predictor. The plots show the Sensitivity of the predictor along with the accuracy of predicted Squashes (Precision). Sensitivity (also referred to as Coverage), on the x-axis, is defined as the number of actual dependence violations that are predicted as such. That is, Sensitivity =
T rueP ositives T rueP ositives+F alseN egatives
Sensitivity is an important metric because it shows the proportion of dependent loads that were correctly predicted. On the y-axis, the proportion of correct squash predictions is given by P recision =
T rueP ositives T rueP ositives+F alseP ositives
This is metric is significant because it tells us what proportion of checkpoints placed is actually required.
The results show that larger table sizes result in higher sensitivity, but at the cost of a larger number of false positives. What this means in terms of checkpointing is that if the predictor is used directly to place checkpoints, a larger table would result in better coverage. That is, a higher proportion of dependent loads would be checkpointed. The higher number of false positives, however, would result in a larger number of unnecessary checkpoints. It should be noted that the range of variation in sensitivity is dramatically different for different benchmarks. mcf shows very little change in going from one entry upwards, while other benchmarks show strong improvement. For comparison, the fraction of loads that are dependent is 0.7% averaged across these benchmarks. This means that a naïve predictor that always predicts a dependence would have a Precision of 0.007 and a Sensitivity of 1.
We see that for most benchmarks, and on average, the line for the hybrid bimodal predictor lies well above any of the other predictors. This means that we can achieve a given sensitivity with fewer false positives. When we compare the simpler address and Program Counter predictors, we observe higher sensitivity for a given table size if we use Program Counter based prediction. This is true for all the benchmarks. However, bzip2, and for some table sizes, gap and twolf show a better tradeoff between sensitivity and true positive rates for an address based predictor. Of the predictors evaluated, the best sensitivity is achieved by the aggressive OR predictor. This is at the cost of a high False Positive rate. The more conservative AND predictor provides a better tradeoff, but still This comparative performance leads to the conclusion that if space and power are at a premium, then using a simple Program Counter based predictor can be considered. Otherwise, a hybrid bimodal predictor combining Program Counter and address predictors is the best choice.
B. Evaluating Checkpointing
In this section we use some of the predictors described earlier to place checkpoints. For comparison, we also place checkpoints by stride and evaluate the results.
The purpose of checkpointing is to reduce wasteful reexecution. A measure of wasteful re-execution is the number of unnecessarily squashed instructions. When a task is squashed, the violated load and every instruction after that has to be re-executed. However, in practice, there may be instructions between the start of the task and the offending load. These instructions do not have to be re-executed to maintain correctness, and re-execution only occurs as a consequence of where task boundaries are placed. Here we refer to these instructions as wasted instructions. We evaluate checkpointing policies by observing the effect of checkpointing on the number of wasted instructions. In Figure 6 , the reduction in wasted instructions for address, Program Counter, hybrid and stride based checkpointing is shown. The wasted re-execution is shown as a proportion of the wasted re-execution in the case without any checkpointing. For the address and PC predictors, tables of size 32 are used, and the hybrid bimodal employs a 128 entry, 5 bit metatable. A maximum of 8 checkpoints per task are available. For all the predictors checkpoints are placed directly on a positive prediction if the maximum number of checkpoints has not been reached, except hybrid-H, where the heuristic described in Section III-D is employed. Predictor based checkpoints behave consistently with the results in the previous section. The PC predictor provides the most reduction in wasted instructions, followed by the hybrid bimodal and address predictor. This is in keeping with the sensitivity observed for these predictors. In Figure 7 , the efficiency of checkpoints is shown in terms of the reduction in wasted re-execution per checkpoint plotted against the wasted re-execution 5 . Here, it can be seen that the address based predictor, apart from having the lowest savings among the three predictor types, is also the least efficient in terms of savings per checkpoint, saving only an average of 21 instructions per checkpoint. The PC based predictor gets better savings with greater efficiency than the address based predictor. The hybrid bimodal predictor places checkpoints with the highest savings per checkpoint, and obtains a reduction in wasted instructions that lies between that for the PC and address predictors. Using the heuristic instead of directly using the prediction improves both the total savings and the savings per benchmark.
The predictors are also compared against stride checkpointing. The efficiency of checkpoints inserted by stride is far lower. Small strides result in reducing wasted re-execution, but with very small savings per checkpoint. Larger strides fail to produce much saving.
The average saving per checkpoint for all the schemes is fairly low -the highest, for the hybrid bimodal predictor with the heuristic, is an average of 54 instructions per checkpoint. This means, that to obtain any advantage from checkpointing for these programs, it is important that the checkpointing mechanism has low overhead.
The effects on execution time and power of checkpointing are shown in Figure 8 . For this evaluation we use a hybrid bimodal dependence predictor for inserting checkpoints, and selective restart is employed. The tasks for the SPEC2000 benchmarks have been selected through a profiler. This has resulted in tasks with late dependences being pruned out. This results in a low ratio of wasted instructions to committed instructions. Even though few tasks in these benchmarks are good candidates for checkpointing, there is still a 5% improvement in energy delay on average, with up to 20% for vpr, 17% for bzip2 and 10% for gzip. The source of this is an improvement in power, with a negligible effect on execution time on average. We do observe some speedups and slowdowns for individual programs. The worst slowdowns are for gap and parser (7% each), while bzip2 and vpr see substantial speedups of 5% and 6% respectively. By comparison, if a stride predictor is used without the selective restart mechanism proposed in this paper, the results are disappointing. For a stride of 200 instructions, there is some reduction in power, but the slowdown is enough to result in greater Energy consumption than base TLS. There is an Energy Delay degradation of 8%. Smaller strides lead to even greater degradation (11% for a stride of 50). Larger strides get closer to base TLS for both power and execution time. In the extreme case a very large stride leads to not placing any checkpoints at all, thus having identical performance to base TLS.
astar and sphinx3 from SPEC2006 have much longer running tasks than any of the SPEC2000 benchmarks. In particular, sphinx regularly shows violations 450 instructions from a task boundary. This presents a good opportunity for energy savings through checkpointing. astar has greater variation in task sizes and how far into tasks violating loads occur. This makes it a good candidate for checkpointing as well. astar and sphinx show an energy delay improvement of 13% and 12% respectively. For all the benchmarks evaluated, checkpointing results in a 6% energy delay improvement on average.
In Figure 9 , we show the effect of selective restart, as described in Section III-B1, on execution time. For this experiment, the hybrid bimodal predictor is used, and apart from selective restart, the checkpointing scheme is otherwise identical for both cases. All execution times are normalized against base TLS and sequential execution time is shown for comparison. We note that the programs showing substantial improvement in execution time due to checkpointing (bzip2, vpr and astar) only do so when selective restart is used. The selective restart mechanism also reduces the execution time penalty on gap, parser and sphinx3. The benchmarks that see little effect on execution time from checkpointing consequently see little effect from selective restart. The mean improvement in execution time due to selective restart is 3%, with up to 8% for bzip2 and astar, and 5% for vpr.
VI. RELATED WORK
c) Thread Level Speculation: Thread level speculation has been previously proposed (e.g., [4] , [5] , [8] , [16] , [17] ) as a means to provide some degree of parallelism in the presence of data dependences. The vast majority of prior work on TLS systems has focused on architectural features directly related to the TLS support, such as protocols for multi-versioned caches and data dependence violation detection. Renau et al. [12] , [13] propose mechanisms for energy efficient speculation. Checkpointing is orthogonal to that work, since it reduces the amount of re-execution, rather than making re-execution less expensive. We use the system proposed by Renau et al. as our baseline.
d) Intermediate Checkpointing: In this paper we use checkpoints to tolerate dependences between speculative tasks. The work by Colohan et al. [3] proposes checkpointing while extending the TLS mechanism to support long running threads. They place checkpoints at fixed instruction strides without any dependence prediction. We find that this approach is not suitable for our applications and causes slowdowns. We apply checkpoints to smaller tasks as well, which means the overhead of checkpoints is not negligible and so smarter placement schemes are required. Waliullah and Stenstrom [21] look at checkpoints to improve behavior for transactions in a Transactional Memory system and use an address based criticality table to place checkpoints. This is one of the prediction schemes we evaluate.
Other proposals have been made to tolerate dependences between tasks through learning dependences and synchronizing to avoid violations [2] , [10] , [18] . A different mechanism for selective re-execution is to find the slice of instructions affected by a dependence violation [15] . The system proposed by Tuck and Tullsen [20] uses multiple contexts to recover from failed value prediction. Checkpoints as described here can be used to recover from failed value prediction as well as failed dependence speculation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we improved the efficiency of TLS systems by crafting effective checkpointing. We performed an evaluation of various dependence prediction techniques and showed that our Program Counter based and hybrid predictors outperform earlier proposals. there has been no previous comparison of dependence prediction techniques for coarse grained speculation. The evaluation also shows that using dependence prediction is a far more efficient way of placing checkpoints than doing so by stride as proposed previously. We have also proposed architectural and protocol changes to allow more effective checkpointing, and demonstrated that the new selective restart mechanism is important for maintaining the performance benefits of TLS while reducing the energy expended.
We conclude that checkpointing based on dependence prediction is an effective way of reducing wasteful re-execution in speculative execution. It allows us to save power in speculative execution with a negligible effect on the performance benefit of TLS.
